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We present a two-part study, the purpose of which is to highlight that new disclosure initiatives 
such as oil and mineral tax payment disclosure as mandated under the Transparency Amendment 1 
and as about to be mandated by the European Union2, have a place in the investment world and an 
impact on investment decisions. The study identifies the listed companies that integrate the 
principle of disclosure of tax payments on a country-by-country basis into their reporting activity3 
and measures their financial performance as well as their performance with respect to human and 
environmental protection rights of the communities where they interact. This second type of 
performance is important from the investors’ point of view since it is intimately related to political 
risk and the ‘social license to operate’.  
 
Both parts of the study find a positive correlation between transparency and the performance 
category. Although we recognize that we only have shown an association of results in this study and 
that transparency in its own right will not be a panacea to all investment - related worries, the 
results do provide support for a business case in favor of expanding on transparency measures 
within the extractive industry. 
 
Only 17 transparent companies disclosing on a country-by-country basis 
We surveyed 70 companies: all of the 57 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
supporting companies as of August 2011 as well as all of the extractive industry companies, non-
EITI supporters, but which report along the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) framework 
guidelines (with the expectations that there could be transparent companies that do not support 
the EITI.) There were 13 companies in this situation. 
 
                                                 
1
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Section 1504, 2010  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf. 
2
 The European Commission issued its Proposal for Directive on transparency requirements, an amendment to the 
Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC, at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:390:0038:0038:EN:PDF), as part of its Responsible 
Business Initiative Package on October 25 2011. 
3
 To shed more light on the potential impacts of the Transparency Amendment, ideally the project would have 
analyzed disclosure on a project-by-project basis. Unfortunately only 3 companies disclose on a project-by-project 
basis and among them, 2 disclose that way as a result of having one project by country. See the section describing 
the results for more information. 
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We opened all the sustainability reports starting with 2010 back to 2005 to find out about their 
disclosure policies. We found that only 17 companies disclosed their tax payments on a country-by 
country basis in 2010 and only 3 on a project-by-project basis. These are named ‘Transparent 
Companies.’  Among those 17 companies, 8 companies disclose their tax payments disaggregated by 
tax type (what we call here Advanced Transparent Companies). 4 Among those 8 companies, 4 
companies have been diligent with tax payment disclosure for 4 years or more. 
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17 extractive industry companies disclosing on a country-by-country basis (including 8 companies 
disclosing their tax payments disaggregated by tax type) 
 
 
In this sample, only 3 companies disclose on a project-by-project basis: 
- Iamgold, when the project is 100% owned by the company. 
- Lundin and Oz Minerals, since they only have one project in each of the countries they operate as 
of December 2010. 
DeBeers discloses on a country-by-country basis but is a private company so the company could not 
be included for the purpose of this analysis. 
 
To match this sample of ‘Transparent’ companies, we identified 17 ‘Non-Transparent’ companies 
(that do not disclose on a country-by-country basis) with similar characteristics: the ratio of EITI 
versus non-EITI companies and the ratio of large versus small companies are comparable in both 
samples with the caveat that oil companies are more heavily represented in the sample of non-
transparent companies. This is not by choice but by circumstance: among the EITI supporting 
companies, the mining companies are more inclined to country-by-country tax payment disclosure 
than the oil companies although the EITI supporters are broken down in equivalent proportion 















We note that 3 EITI supporting companies were not included in any of the samples because their 
disclosure is done at the regional level: Vale, Glencore and JX Nippon. These companies are 
considered not transparent enough to enter the sample of transparent companies but more 
transparent than the sample of non-transparent companies. 
 
Transparency is correlated with better financial results 
Identifying the Variables of Financial Performance  
We selected 3 ratios that reflect the performance of the company in terms of profitability or 
efficiency and that are used by investors to compare a company to its peers within the same 
industry. 
The Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E ratio): it shows how much investors are willing to pay per dollar of 
earnings.  
Return on Equity (ROE): it measures a company's profitability by showing how much profit a 
company generates with the money shareholders have invested.  
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Return on Invested Capital (ROIC): it assesses a company's efficiency at allocating the capital under 





The results show that transparent companies are associated with a better performance along those 
ratios. We are aware that these results only reveal correlation and association of results and do not 
claim to bring evidence of a causality effect. 
 
Transparency correlated with fewer cases of human and environmental rights violation   
In this second part of the study, the purpose was to analyze the performance of extractive industry 
companies along the lines of reported cases of human rights violation and environmental damage.  
Methodology 
Reported cases were researched and analyzed for the calendar year 2011. The focus included 
disputes and allegations, which freshly arose during the period, or were long-standing and live 
disputes during the calendar year 2011. To categorize the cases, we built on the framework used by 
the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) in its report to the Special Representative6 
                                                 
5
 Data is detailed in annex.  
6
 His mandate ended in June 2011. 
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on Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises7, due to its 
comprehensive coverage of social, environmental and corporate governance issues specific to the 
Extractive Industry. The ICMM framework offers the issue categories, here below.  
ISSUE CATEGORY8                                     DEFINITION USED   
Civil conflict 
 
Revenues, payments or other support from company allegedly used by 
government / state entity / rebel group to fuel conflict, or conflict 
between different groups over distribution of revenues. 
Security 
 
Security arrangements – alleged abusive actions of personnel guarding 
the mines / in region of mines. 
Indigenous 
 
Rights of indigenous peoples alleged to be infringed (i.e., group 
identified as ‘indigenous’ being allegedly harmed). 
Resettlement and 
compensation 
Resettlement alleged to have been undertaken unfairly, or perceived 
inadequate compensation for land / property. 
ASM 
 
Interests / position of traditional / artisanal or small-scale miners 
alleged to be undermined. 
Health & 
Environment 
Alleged / feared health and environment failures. 
Safety Alleged / feared safety failures. 
Economic 
 
Perceived negative economic impacts, or perceived insufficient local 
economic benefits, including negative impact on livelihoods. 
Corporate power 
 
Perceived undue political influence of company, including both (a) 
revenues and existence of company as investor allegedly helping to 
legitimize human rights abusing regime or (b) government allegedly 
bending to wishes of company. 
Consultation 
 
Alleged failure by company to consult meaningfully or secure consent. 
Corruption 
 




Alleged labor abuses, including forced labor, child labor, lack of freedom 
of association or union representation, racial or sexual discrimination, 
harassment or abuse. 
 
                                                 
7
 ICMM- Second submission to the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Human Rights and Business - 
Mining and Human Rights: how the UN SRSG can help spread good practice and tackle critical issues - October 
2006. 
8
 Those issues and definitions are from the ICMM framework and haven’t been amended by our study. 
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For each reporting case of irresponsible corporate behavior, up to two flashpoint issues, and as 
many other issues, were identified and tagged along the issue categories described above. A 
flashpoint issue is defined as the focal or primary issue in a dispute, whereas ‘other issues’ includes 
multiple facets connected or unconnected to the focal issue, but which were nonetheless observed 
in the context of the dispute. The analysis was conducted for each of the 34 sampled companies. 
The total issues were then compiled for each of the samples of transparent and non-transparent 
companies.  
Data Collection 
For the purpose of data collection, given the absence of a single comprehensive repository for 
world-wide data on the subject, the following three sources were researched: 
- Proprietary data from OECD National Contact Points (NCPs)9 that are mandated to receive 
and adjudicate cases of violations of OECD Guidelines on MNCs. NCPs receive complaints 
from NGOs and publish quarterly reports on statistics.  
- Business and Human Rights website10 - The repository includes cases raised in forums in 
diverse jurisdictions and legal settings. It also compiles data on cases, which might not 
necessarily have been or are being addressed in legal forums. The data was analyzed using 
individual companies as search criteria. 
- Corpwatch11 – The website aggregates newsfeed on communities’ rights violations by 
corporations. Industry categories of Natural Resources, Oil and Energy were reviewed.  
The results from these three sites were combined to give a final tally for each case category for 
the transparent and non-transparent sampled companies. 
Results 
From our analysis of disputes in 2011, we found that a total of 55 flashpoint issues and 19 
additional issues could be traced for companies, which were not transparent about their tax 
payments in 2010. Similarly, for companies, which were transparent with their tax payments in 
2010, there were a total of 32 flashpoint issues and 10 additional issues. The chart in Figure 1 
below indicates that non-transparent companies reported 43% more issues than their more 
transparent counterparts.  
 














The results from a deeper analysis of issue distribution are indicated in Figure 2 below. In 7 out of 
11 issue categories, non-transparent companies reflected a higher incidence of issues as compared 
to transparent companies. These categories include ‘civil conflict’, ‘corporate power’, ‘corruption’, 
‘economic’, ‘environment’, ‘compensation’, and ‘consultation’. The highest number of cases was 
reported for categories including ‘environment’, ‘civil conflict’, ‘corporate power’, ‘corruption’, and 
‘economic’ collectively accounting for 77% of a total of 74 cases reported for non-transparent 
companies, and 54% of a total of 42 cases reported for transparent companies.  
 
An analysis of divergence indicates that there is near competitive performance of the two samples 
in the ‘environment’, ‘security’, ‘safety’, ‘indigenous’, ‘consultation’, and ‘labor’ categories. 
Categories where the number of reporting cases of non-transparent companies drastically 
outnumbered that of transparent companies were observed in instances of corporate complicity in 
the perpetuation of ‘civil conflict’, ‘corruption’, and ‘corporate power’. Interestingly those categories 
are the various facets of the resource curse. Non-transparent companies also display more 
reporting cases in the ‘economic’ and ‘compensation’ categories.  
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Overall, the results of this study leads us to believe that on average, transparency revealed in 
companies’ willingness to disclose information about their tax payments in the countries where 
they operate is associated with less reported cases of corporate misbehavior. However the similar 
performance of both samples on certain indicators might indicate that transparency as currently 
handled by the sample of ‘transparent companies’ (country-by-country basis reporting, not always 
disaggregated by tax type) hasn’t fully led yet to enshrining the fundamental values associated with 
transparency: accountability, fairness and sustainability. One could assume that increasing the level 
of disclosure to a project-by-project basis will increase the corporate standards since the company 
will be held accountable on a project-by-project basis or in other words on a community-by-
community basis. 
    
We conclude that this study lends support to the business case argument in favor of mandatory 
rules of disclosure, both through the positive association of results and through the interpretation 
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of the need for a further push on transparency. A more rigorous transparency regime seems to have 
its place from a business perspective. 
 
Perrine Toledano, Lead Economics and Policy Researcher12 
 
Research conducted by: Shweta Dhiman, Saphonia 
Foster, Keith Miao, Osaretin Osarenren 
 
 
Annex – Table of Results – Source: Bloomberg as of 12/09/11 




                                                 
12
 Many thanks to Nancy Siporin for her close review and to Julien Topal for his useful inputs. 
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About the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, a joint center of Columbia Law 
School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading applied research center and 
forum for the study, practice and discussion of sustainable international investment.  Our mission is 
to develop and disseminate practical approaches and solutions to maximize the impact of 
international investment for sustainable development.  The VCC’s premise is that responsible 
investment leads to benefits for both investors and the residents of host countries.  Through 
research, advisory projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue and educational programs, the VCC focuses 
on constructing and implementing a holistic investment framework that promotes sustainable 
development and the mutual trust needed for long-term investments, that can be practically 
adopted by governments, companies and  civil society. Please visit our website 
(www.vcc.columbia.edu) to learn more about our research and advisory projects. 
 
